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Theory of Mind in Middle Childhood: Longitudinal Associations with Executive 
Function and Social Competence 
Abstract 
The vast majority of studies on theory of mind have focused on the preschool years. 
Extending the developmental scope of theory-of-mind (ToM) research presents opportunities 
to both reassess theoretical accounts of ToM and test its predictive utility. The twin aims of 
this longitudinal study were to examine developmental relations between ToM, executive 
function (EF) and teacher-rated social competence in middle childhood. 137 children (69 
males) were followed across a 4-year period spanning middle childhood (M Ages at Waves 1 
and 2 = 6.05, SD= .35, and 10.81, SD = .35). Individual differences in ToM were moderately 
stable across middle childhood. While there were concurrent associations between ToM and 
EF at both time points, there were no longitudinal links between these constructs. In contrast, 
there were concurrent and longitudinal links between ToM and teacher-rated social 
competence, such that individual differences in ToM predicted later social competence at 
school. These results are discussed in light of competing theories about the links between 
ToM and EF and the importance of individual differences in ToM for children’s social lives. 
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Theory of Mind in Middle Childhood: Longitudinal Associations with Executive 
Function and Social Competence 
Scientific interest in the human ability to reason about mental states and how children acquire 
a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM), has flourished over the past three decades, with lively debate still 
evident in developmental psychology and numerous related disciplines (for reviews see: 
Hughes & Devine, 2015; Wellman, 2014). Recent years have seen a massive expansion in the 
developmental scope of this research field, with exciting new findings from studies of 
infancy (e.g., Baillargeon, Scott & He, 2010), middle childhood (e.g. Devine & Hughes, 
2013), adolescence (e.g., Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 2010) and adulthood (e.g., 
Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache & Desgranges, 2011). Nevertheless, an overwhelming 
majority of studies have continued to focus on the preschool years. A further limit to research 
in this area has been a heavy reliance on cross-sectional designs that preclude analysis of 
developmental relations. Addressing these twin gaps, the current longitudinal study examined 
developmental relations across middle childhood between individual differences in ToM and 
two key correlates: (i.) executive function (EF) and (ii.) social competence.  
ToM and EF in Middle Childhood 
 Executive Function (EF) is an umbrella term that encompasses the set of higher-order 
cognitive abilities involved in controlling thought and action. These include over-riding 
habitual responses (‘inhibition’), shifting between tasks (‘cognitive set shifting’) and holding 
information in mind to guide future action (‘working memory’) (Carlson, Zelazo & Faja, 
2013). These processes are measured using tasks that appear quite distinct on the surface but 
are thought to measure a common underlying ability. The typically modest correlations 
between different measures of EF reflect the task impurity problem: differences in the non-
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executive demands of tasks designed to measure EF (that is, the surface or task-specific 
features) are assumed to mask underlying commonalities (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; 
Miyake et al., 2000). To overcome this problem studies often adopt an aggregate approach to 
assessing EF via a number of different tasks designed to capture inhibition, set shifting, 
working memory or some combination thereof (Miyake & Friedman, 2012).  
In a recent meta-analysis of data from 102 studies involving almost 10,000 3- to 6-
year-old children from 15 countries, Devine and Hughes (2014) reported a moderate mean 
effect size for the correlation between one aspect of ToM (i.e., false belief understanding) and 
EF, r = .38. The goal of the meta-analysis was to test the predictions from competing 
theoretical accounts of the association between ToM and EF. According to the expression 
account, these constructs share overlapping peripheral task demands such that performance 
on measures designed to index ToM requires some degree of executive control (Perner, Lang 
& Kloo, 2002). In other words, EF is not developmentally linked with ToM. In contrast, 
others have proposed at least two distinct (and competing) functional relations between EF 
and ToM (Perner & Lang, 2000). For example, several theorists have posited that the 
acquisition of ToM is necessary for the development or emergence of EF (e.g., Carruthers, 
1996; Perner & Lang, 1999). Specifically, understanding the relation between mental states 
and behavior (meta-representation) enables children to control their own thoughts and 
actions. Other theorists have argued that EF enables children to attend to and reflect upon 
others’ mental states and so permits the growth of ToM (e.g., Russell, 1996). Supporting a 
hybrid ‘emergence-expression’ account, the meta-analysis revealed that the correlation 
between ToM and EF was stable in magnitude across age groups (from ages 3 to 6), different 
EF tasks and geographical regions but was weaker for indirect measures of ToM (i.e., tasks 
involving looking time responses) than for direct measures of ToM (i.e., tasks involving an 
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explicit verbal or motor response). The available longitudinal data showed an asymmetric 
developmental association between EF and ToM: while early EF predicted later ToM (even 
when controlling for previous ToM and verbal ability) early ToM did not predict later EF.  
While much has been learned about the links between ToM and EF in the preschool 
years, relatively little is known about the association between these constructs in middle 
childhood. It is possible that the developmental association between ToM and EF might 
change beyond the preschool years; if only because middle childhood (the period from ages 6 
to 11) is, in most cultures, characterized by entry into formal primary education. As a result 
children are exposed to increasingly sophisticated forms of knowledge (e.g., fictional 
literature), new expectations about regulating their behavior, and widening social horizons 
through interactions with peers and adults outside the family (Del Giudice, 2014). Alongside 
evidence for parallel age-related improvements across middle childhood and adolescence in 
both EF (e.g., Davidson, Amso, Anderson & Diamond, 2006; Huizinga, Dolan & Van Der 
Molen, 2006) and ToM (e.g., Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant &Todd, 2011; Devine & 
Hughes, 2013), recent cross-sectional studies show correlations between measures of these 
two constructs in middle childhood (e.g., Lagattuta, Sayfan & Blattman, 2010; Lagattuta, 
Sayfan & Harvey, 2014). However, the findings from these cross-sectional studies do not 
demonstrate that there are developmental links between EF and ToM beyond the preschool 
years.  
The expansion of research on ToM into middle childhood (and beyond) raises 
important measurement questions, for which the competence/performance distinction (e.g., 
Meins, Fernyhough, Johnson & Lidstone, 2006) may be helpful. By middle childhood there is 
little doubt that children understand mental-state concepts such as beliefs and desires (i.e., 
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ToM competence). Thus individual differences in middle childhood might reflect variation in 
children’s ability to use this understanding flexibly and appropriately (i.e., ToM 
performance). Support for this proposal comes from recent studies (e.g., Apperly, Warren, 
Andrews, Grant &Todd, 2011; Banerjee et al., 2011) that show age-related differences in 
performance on the same task items across middle childhood on a range of ToM tasks that do 
not require any new conceptual insights. For example, Apperly et al. (2011) found age-
related increases in performance across middle childhood on a task that required participants 
to judge which of two boxes a protagonist would look in for an object (i.e., to understand 
first-order false beliefs). As the authors suggest, it is unlikely that changes in children’s 
conceptual understanding underpin such age-related contrasts. 
The current longitudinal study applied age-appropriate batteries of tasks for each 
time-point (ages 6 and 10) that were designed to assess individual differences in children’s 
ability to reason about others’ beliefs, knowledge and desires. At the first time-point we used 
a task battery devised by Hughes et al. (2000), which has been shown to have good test-retest 
reliability and internal consistency and to be sensitive to individual differences in a sample of 
1116 pairs of 5-year-old twins (Hughes et al., 2005). This battery consisted of picture-book 
and puppet-based tasks designed to measure first- and second-order false belief 
understanding as well as the ability to infer emotions linked to false beliefs. For the second 
time point, we constructed a novel multi-modal task battery that included two widely-used 
‘advanced’ ToM tasks, the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) and the Triangles Task 
(Castelli et al., 2000), as well as one recently-designed task: the Silent Film task (Devine & 
Hughes, 2013). These three tasks used text-based vignettes, animated geometric figures and 
short clips from a silent film to depict social scenarios and children were required to refer to 
characters’ mental states in order to explain their actions. Despite the growth in the number 
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and type of available ‘advanced’ ToM tasks suitable for use in middle childhood, little 
consideration has been given to the relations between tasks purporting to measure ToM in 
this developmental period. By including a battery of diverse ToM tasks we hoped to assess 
both these inter-relations and the links between performance on ‘advanced’ tasks and classic 
tests of first- and second-order false belief understanding.  
Our first aim was to elucidate the nature of the links between individual differences in 
ToM and EF in middle childhood. To this end, we assessed children’s performance in each 
domain at two time points spanning middle childhood at ages 6 and 10 (i.e., when children 
were in their first and final years of primary school). Our goal was to test the predictions 
from competing theoretical accounts based on findings from preschoolers. Specifically, the 
expression account predicts concurrent but not longitudinal links between these constructs. 
That is, while EF might be implicated in the use of ToM (and hence shows concurrent 
associations with ToM performance), it will not play a role in the development of ToM 
(Apperly, 2011). In contrast, two other accounts predict both concurrent and longitudinal 
associations between EF and ToM. For proponents of the meta-representation account (e.g., 
Perner & Lang, 1999), longitudinal associations would be expected between early ToM and 
later EF (only), while proponents of the emergence account (e.g., Hughes, 1998) would 
predict significant independent associations between early EF and later ToM (but not vice-
versa). Meta-analytic evidence from preschoolers favors the latter account, but the nature of 
the association between ToM and EF has yet to be investigated in middle childhood.  
ToM, EF and Social Competence in Middle Childhood 
The vigor with which ToM has been researched over the past 30 years reflects a 
widely held assumption that ToM is a central foundation of everyday social interaction 
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(Ratcliffe, 2007). The growing recognition that typically developing children show striking 
variation in ToM led to speculation that these normative individual differences underpin key 
social outcomes in children’s lives (Dunn et al., 1991). This drove the development of the 
‘social individual differences’ account of ToM (Apperly, 2012). Although a large number of 
studies have demonstrated the influence of children’s early social experiences on later 
individual differences in ToM (Hughes & Devine, 2015) there is less evidence to support the 
view that ToM matters for social competence. Findings from existing cross-sectional studies 
are mixed. Some studies show moderate to strong correlations between false belief 
understanding and adult ratings of young children’s social competence (e.g., Watson, Nixon, 
Wilson & Capage, 1999) while others have failed to replicate these findings (e.g., Astington, 
2003; Newton & Jenvey, 2011). In middle childhood, researchers have found weak to 
moderate links between ToM and peer-rated acceptance (Banerjee, Watling & Caputi, 2011) 
and self-rated loneliness (Devine & Hughes, 2013). These findings might indicate that 
individual differences in ToM matter more for children’s social competence in middle 
childhood than in the early years. 
A more critical examination of these findings exposes two shortcomings in the 
literature. First, Astington (2003) has highlighted the need to rule out potentially spurious 
associations between ToM and social competence reflecting, for example, shared links with 
language ability. Alongside language, links between EF and social competence have also 
been reported in early childhood (e.g. Razza & Blair, 2009; Rhoades, Greenberg & 
Domitrovich, 2009). Studies of the link between ToM and social competence in middle 
childhood have yet to account for the potentially confounding effects of EF. Second, the 
existing evidence in support of the social individual differences account is largely cross-
sectional and so open to at least two possible explanations (Astington, 2003). That is, while 
Running Head: THEORY OF MIND IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD 
 9 
the ability to reason about others’ mental states may impact on children’s social behavior, it 
is equally possible that early acquisition of learned social behaviors facilitates children’s 
performance on ToM tasks.  
To date, longitudinal studies of the association between ToM and social competence 
in early and middle childhood have revealed mixed findings regarding the direction of 
association between these two constructs (e.g., Jenkins & Astington, 2000; Banerjee et al., 
2011). Our second aim was therefore to examine the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
associations between ToM and teacher’s ratings of children’s social competence in school 
settings. We sought to extend the literature in two ways. Firstly, we controlled for potentially 
confounding factors such as individual differences in EF, verbal ability and socio-economic 
status in our analyses. Secondly, the availability of measures of ToM, EF and social 
competence at two time points permitted us to assess the direction of any developmental 
associations between these constructs across a 4-year period in middle childhood.  
 To summarize, our study had two primary aims. The first aim was to investigate 
whether EF and ToM continue to be developmentally (i.e., functionally) related across 
middle childhood, by examining cross sectional and longitudinal associations between EF 
and ToM. We were also able to gather teachers’ ratings of social competence at each time-
point and so our second aim was to examine the relations between individual differences 
ToM, EF and social competence in middle childhood.    
Method 
Participants 
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Participants were recruited from a panel of 184 children who had previously taken 
part in longitudinal study tracking children’s social and cognitive development from ages 4 to 
6 years. We achieved 90% contact (re-establishing contact with 166/184 families). Thirteen 
children were not eligible to take part, either because they no longer lived in the UK or 
because they had a diagnosed developmental disorder and a further 16 of those eligible either 
declined to take part or withdrew consent resulting in a final sample of 137 participants (69 
males) (90% of eligible children). Binary logistic regression revealed that while non-returners 
did not differ significantly from returners in age, verbal ability or maternal education, they 
were more likely to be male, OR = 2.58, B = .95, SE = .42, p = .03 (See Table S1 for 
description of eligible and returning participants at Wave1). Although ethnically homogenous 
(94% white), the sample was socio-economically diverse: 36% of the participants’ mothers 
had no educational qualifications or age 16 qualifications only. The mean age of participants 
at Wave 1 was 6.05 years, SD = .35, Range: 5.22 – 6.98. At Wave 2 the mean age of 
participants was 10.81 years, SD = .35, Range: 10.01 – 11.95. The mean testing interval was 
4.76 years, SD = .38, Range: 3.27 – 5.57. Given the age spread in our sample, we controlled 
for age in our analyses. 
Procedures 
At both Wave 1 and 2, participants were tested individually at school by experienced 
graduate researchers using counter-balanced task batteries in which measures of EF 
alternated with measures of ToM (see Table 1 for summary of tasks). At the end of each 
session participants were thanked with a small gift or a book token. Teachers rated 
participants’ social competence via a postal questionnaire. Teacher questionnaires were 
completed for 103 participants at both study waves. There were no differences between 
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participants whose teachers did or did not return questionnaires in terms of age or verbal 
ability at Wave 1, gender and maternal education, Nagelkerke R
2
 = .01, χ2 (4) = 1.08, p = .89. 
Importantly, there were no significant differences in teacher-rated social competence at Wave 
1 between those whose teachers did (M = 44.04, SD = 8.37) and did not return (M = 44.13, 
SD =8.76) questionnaires at Wave 2, t (127) = 0.05, p = 0.96.  
Measures 
 ToM at Wave 1. In the Object Transfer False-Belief Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) 
participants watched while an object was moved from one location to another while a puppet 
was absent. The puppet then searched for the object in the original location. To succeed on 
this task participants needed to both explain the puppet’s behavior and identify the object’s 
actual location (control question). In the Unexpected Contents False-Belief Task (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1989) participants were shown a cereal box and a plain box and asked where they 
would expect to find cereal. They were then shown that the cereal box was empty but the 
plain box contained cereal. To succeed on this task, participants needed to predict where an 
uninformed puppet would look for cereal and to recall where the cereal really was (control 
question). Scores from these two tasks were significantly correlated, ϕ (135) = .27, p < .001 
and summed to create a 0-2 point ‘Predict/Explain False Belief’ score. 
The Emotion False-Belief Tasks involved two puppet-based stories that included 
either a nice or nasty surprise (Harris et al., 1989). For example, in one story Leo the Lion 
received a nasty surprise when another character replaced the contents of a can of his favorite 
drink (Cola) with a drink he disliked (Juice). In both stories participants were only given test 
questions if they responded correctly to two forced-choice emotion comprehension questions 
(e.g., How does Leo feel when he drinks juice?). Participants were scored as failing these 
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items if they did not pass the two forced-choice comprehension questions. Test questions for 
both stories were also presented in a forced-choice format and required the participants to 
predict a character’s false belief (e.g., What does Leo think is in the can, Cola or juice?) and 
recall the actual contents. Participants were also asked to infer an emotion based upon both 
belief and desire information (e.g., How does he feel before he drinks from the can?), and to 
explain their response (e.g., “He’s happy because he thinks there’s Cola in the can”). Finally, 
participants received two comprehension questions about the character’s emotion on learning 
the actual contents of the container and were only credited with success if they passed both 
the relevant false belief prediction and comprehension questions. Thus across the two tasks 
participants’ answered two questions in which they had to attribute a first order false belief. 
Scores on these two trials were correlated, ϕ (135) = .41, p < .001, and were summed 
together. We called this score ‘Predict Other’s False Belief (I)’ (range: 0 – 2). Participants 
also answered two questions in which they had to infer and explain an emotion based on a 
false belief. The scores from these two trials were correlated, ϕ (135) = .47, p < .001, and 
summed to create the ‘Infer/Explain Emotion based on False Belief’ score (range: 0 – 4; that 
is, 1 point for each correct inference and explanation). 
The Second-Order False-Belief Tasks assessed participants’ ability to infer a 
character’s beliefs about another character’s beliefs via two picture book tasks (Sullivan et 
al., 1994). In one story, Peter’s mother wants to surprise him for his birthday by buying him a 
puppy, but telling him she will buy a toy. Unbeknown to her, however, Peter discovers the 
puppy. Participants were first given a forced-choice test question about Peter’s initial false 
belief and a control question about Peter’s actual birthday gift. Following Peter’s discovery 
of the puppy, participants were asked to predict (e.g., Peter’s Granny asks Mum what Peter 
thinks he got for his birthday. What does Mum say?) and explain (e.g., “because Mummy 
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doesn’t know that Peter saw the puppy”) Peter’s mother’s second-order false belief and had 
to also pass two further control questions. Participants only succeeded on the first and second 
order false-belief test questions if they also passed the corresponding control questions. 
Scores on the first-order false belief question from each story were correlated, ϕ (135) = .51, 
p < .001, and so were summed together (range: 0 – 2). We called this score ‘Predict Other’s 
False Belief (II)’. Scores on the second-order false belief question from each story were 
correlated, ϕ (135) = .43, p < .001, and so were summed together. We called this final score 
‘Infer/Explain Second-Order False Belief’ (range: 0 – 4). Sample scripts for these ToM tasks 
can be found in Hughes et al. (2000).  
ToM at Wave 2. The Strange Stories Task (Happé, 1994) consisted of five audio-
visual vignettes depicting social situations, each followed by an open-ended question that 
required participants to explain a character’s behavior with reference to his/her mental states. 
One story involved a double bluff, two stories involved deception and two further stories 
involved misunderstandings. Happé’s (1994) scoring scheme was used to code responses 
(For the full text of the Strange Stories task and corresponding marking scheme see: White, 
Hill, Happé & Frith, 2009). Participants received 0, 1 or 2 points for each incorrect, partially 
correct or fully correct response. A random selection of 25% of anonymized transcripts 
showed moderate to strong levels of inter-rater reliability, mean κ = .70, .49 ≤ κ ≤ .87, all ps 
< .01. Responses to each item were summed to create a ‘Strange Stories’ total score.  
In the Triangles Task (For sample items and scoring guidelines see: Castelli, Happé, 
Frith & Frith, 2000) participants watched three short animations that featured two moving 
triangles and were designed to elicit mental state attributions (coaxing, teasing and 
surprising). After each clip, participants were asked to describe what had happened and their 
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responses were recorded, transcribed and rated for ascription of: (i) intentionality, with scores 
for each item ranging from 0 (non-deliberate actions) to 5 (deliberate actions with the goal of 
affecting others’ mental states; and (ii) accuracy, scored as 0 (incorrect descriptions), 1 
(imprecise or incomplete descriptions) or 2 (correct descriptions of the story or actions 
presented in the clip). In a random selection of 25% of the anonymised transcripts, 
intentionality ratings for individual items exhibited strong inter-rater reliability, mean ICC = 
.80, range .69 - .90, all ps < .01, as did accuracy ratings, mean κ = .71, .60 ≤ κ ≤ .80, all ps < 
.001. We summed together intentionality and accuracy scores for each item to create a 
‘Triangles’ total score.  
In the Silent Film Task (For test description and sample items see: Devine & Hughes, 
2013) participants were required to explain the behavior of characters in scenarios presented 
in five brief clips from a classic silent comedy. The clips were played once in a fixed order. 
The first clip was accompanied by two questions and the remaining four clips were followed 
by one question each. The responses were scored using the scheme developed by Devine and 
Hughes (2013): participants received 2 points for responses that provided an accurate 
mentalistic explanation of events (e.g., The driver didn’t know that Harold was in the van), 1 
point for responses that refer to the facts but don’t use mentalistic explanations (e.g., The 
driver did not hear Harold) and 0 points for irrelevant or incorrect responses (e.g., The driver 
kidnapped Harold). In a random selection of 25% of the anonymized transcripts individual 
items showed moderate to strong agreement, mean κ = .74, .47 ≤ κ ≤ .93, all ps < .01. Scores 
across each of the 6 questions were summed together to create a ‘Silent Film’ total score. 1 
                                                             
1
 Participants also completed the automated Director Task (Dumontheil et al., 2010). This task did not load onto 
the ToM latent factor but instead loaded onto the EF latent factor. In addition this task did not correlate 
significantly with Wave 1 measures of ToM. The results of this task have been omitted but are available from 
the first author.  
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EF at Wave 1. Participants completed the Tower of London Task (Shallice, 1982) 
using simplified age-appropriate instructions (Hughes, 1998). This task challenges both 
inhibition (e.g., over-riding the impulse to start moving the balls) and working memory (e.g., 
holding in mind the three rules and the target arrangement). Participants had to move a set of 
three colored balls placed in a starting arrangement on three wooden dowels to each target 
arrangement within a specified number of moves. They were told that (1) only one ball could 
be moved at a time, (2) balls underneath another ball could not be moved and (3) the 
maximum number of balls that each dowel could hold (i.e., 3, 2, 1). Trials were administered 
in a fixed order and consisted of three 2-move problems, three 3-move problems and three 4-
move problems. Participants received 1 point for each perfect solution and 0 points for 
solutions that exceeded the number of permissible moves (possible range: 0 – 9).  
Participants completed the Bead Memory task from the Stanford-Binet Intelligence 
Scale (Thorndike, Hagan & Sattler, 1986) at Wave 1 and Wave 2. On each trial participants 
were shown for 5 seconds an arrangement of beads on a stick that varied in shape (ellipsoids, 
spheres, cones and disks) and color (red, white and blue). They were then given a box of 
beads (with three of each type) and asked to reproduce each arrangement exactly. The task 
was discontinued after 3 failures across 4 trials; raw scores were calculated by subtracting the 
number of failed trials from the highest item attempted. Although initially designed to 
measure short-term visual memory, this task challenges multiple EFs (e.g., participants must 
not touch the beads while the image is displayed, the image is then removed such that they 
must hold it in mind while they select the beads, they must then plan ahead in order to place 
the beads on the stick in the correct sequence). Performance on this task is correlated with 
performance on measures of inhibition and set shifting in childhood (e.g., Hongwanishkul, 
Happaney, Lee & Zelazo, 2005; Hughes & Ensor, 2005).  
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The Day/Night Test of conflict inhibition (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994) had 12 
trials; on each trial participants were shown a picture of the sun or moon and asked to say 
‘night’ in response to the sun and ‘day’ in response to the moon. Given the clear significant 
negative skew in the distribution for this task, M = 11.12, SD = 1.85, Zskew = - 15.38, p < .001, 
we dichotomized scores on this task using a median split: participants scoring fewer than 12 
trials out of 12 correctly (N = 45) received a score of 0 and those scoring 12 correctly 
received a score of 1. The mean accuracy score for the ‘failing’ group was 9.33, SD = 2.39. 
The Trucks Game tested participants’ cognitive set shifting (Hughes & Ensor, 2005). 
On the first trial of the initial rule-learning phase of this game, the child was shown a picture 
of two trucks on yellow card and asked to guess which truck would win him or her a treat (in 
fact, the child’s choice was always judged as the correct choice and the child was told to 
remember that truck). On the second trial, the child was shown a second pair of trucks and 
asked to select one of the trucks; again this choice was always recorded as correct and the 
child was told to remember that truck too. On the next 6 trials the child was shown either the 
first or second pair of trucks in a pseudo-random order with the spatial position (left or right) 
of each truck counter-balanced. Within each pair the trucks were quite similar, such that 
some children chose the wrong truck by mistake on early trials; they were therefore given 
verbal feedback on each trial and categorized as passing the pre-shift phase if they chose the 
correct truck for at least four out of the final five trials. Next children completed the post-shift 
phase. This time, each pair of trucks was presented on a green card and the child was told to 
select the other (previously non-rewarded) truck in order to win a treat. There were 8 post-
shift trials and success was indexed by correct choices on at least 4 of the last 5 trials. We 
awarded a score of 1 to participants passing both phases (N = 121) and 0 (N = 16) to those 
who did not.  
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EF at Wave 2. To measure conflict inhibition, participants completed the Arrows 
Task (Davidson et al. 2006). In this task participants viewed one of four images of a purple 
arrow on a white screen. The arrow pointed either directly downward or diagonally on either 
the left- or right-hand side of the screen. During congruent (control) trials, the arrow pointed 
directly downward and participants had to press the button on the same side as where the 
arrow appeared. During incongruent (test) trials, the arrow pointed diagonally and 
participants had to press the button on the opposite side to where the arrow appeared. Before 
beginning, participants received detailed instructions and practice items. Each 750ms trial 
was preceded by a 500ms interval in which a 16-point font black crosshair was displayed 
against a white background. Participants had to respond with a button press within the 750ms 
trial period to each of 12 control trials and 12 test trials administered in a random order. 
Efficiency scores were based on the total number of correct incongruent trials divided by the 
total time taken on incongruent trials. In line with previous studies (Davidson et al., 2006) 
anticipatory responses of < 200ms and missed responses were recorded as errors. 
The Smiling Faces Task (Huizinga et al., 2006) is an index of set shifting. During this 
task participants had to respond to one of four cartoon faces (i.e., a happy boy, a happy girl, a 
sad boy and a sad girl) displayed in one of four quadrants on a screen. In single task trials 
participants were asked to indicate whether a face was (1) a boy or a girl if it appeared in the 
top two quadrants or (2) happy or sad if it appeared in the bottom two quadrants. During 
alternating trials, participants had to integrate both rules. Trials were administered in four 
blocks in a fixed order: one set of 16 single task trials (boy or a girl); another one set of 16 
single task trials (happy or sad); and two sets of 16 alternating trials. Each trial lasted 3500ms 
during which time participants had to respond with a button press. The trials were preceded 
by a 500ms interval in which a 16-point font black crosshair was displayed in the center of 
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the screen on a white background. Trials were presented in a random order within each block. 
We calculated efficiency scores by dividing the total number of correct alternating trials by 
the total time taken on alternating trials.  
Verbal Ability. We used the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) (Dunn, Dunn, 
Whetton & Burley, 1997) to measure verbal ability at both waves. On each item of this 
receptive vocabulary task (suitable for children aged 3- to 16 years) participants were asked 
to pick one picture from a set of four that matched a word read aloud by the examiner. We 
subtracted the number of errors from the item number corresponding to the last number in the 
participant’s ceiling set (that is, sets containing 8 or more errors) to calculate raw scores.  
Social Competence at School. At both study waves teachers completed the 30-item 
Social Skills Rating System (SRSS) (Gresham & Elliot, 1990). The items contain examples of 
behavior associated with cooperation, peer relations, adherence to social conventions, 
assertion, and self-control in social situations at school. Teachers rated the frequency of each 
behavior on a 0 /1 /2-point scale (i.e., Never, Sometimes, Very Often). Total scores therefore 
ranged from 0 to 60 (Wave 1 α = .90; Wave 2 α = .92).  
Results 
Analytic Strategy 
Latent variable and structural equation modelling were undertaken using MPlus 
Version 7 (Muthèn & Muthèn, 2012). To assess the coherence of our diverse tests of ToM 
and EF we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), using a mean- and variance-
adjusted weighted least squares estimator to generate model parameters when task scores 
were categorical (see Table 1) and full information maximum likelihood estimation when the 
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data were continuous and normally distributed (so that all cases with data in Wave 1 could be 
included in both sets of analyses). To examine longitudinal associations in our data, we used 
structural equation modelling. We used four primary criteria to assess the acceptability of our 
measurement and structural models: a non-significant χ2 test of model fit, Comparative Fit 
Index (CFI) > .95, Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) > .95 and Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) < .08 (Brown, 2006). 
To reduce the number of parameters in our structural equation models while 
capitalizing on the benefits of using latent factors, we used the Wave 1 and Wave 2 factor 
scores in the longitudinal models (see Data Reduction). In each of the longitudinal models we 
allowed the predictor variables to inter-correlate. Consistent with previous studies on the 
longitudinal links between EF and ToM (e.g., Hughes & Ensor, 2007), we sought to examine 
the independent association between the Wave 1 independent variable and the Wave 2 
dependent variable controlling for Wave 1 scores on the dependent variable, maternal 
education and Wave 1 verbal ability. We adopted a similar approach when examining the 
longitudinal links between ToM, EF and teacher-rated social competence.  
For the EF and ToM variables at Wave 1 and Wave 2, missing data did not exceed 
1% on any variable in the dataset. No participant had missing data for all test variables. Note 
that there were no ‘gateway’ items in our data. That is, if a participant failed a control 
question, the participant received a score of ‘0’ for that item. There were no missing values 
on any of the background variables (i.e., gender, age, verbal ability, maternal education). For 
teacher-rated social competence, 129 teachers provided ratings at Wave 1 and 103 teachers 
provided ratings at Wave 2. To avoid loss of data, missing values were estimated in Mplus 
using either maximum likelihood or mean- and variance- weighted least squares depending 
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on the model estimator (Muthèn & Muthèn, 2010). Mplus provides reliable estimates of 
missing values and latent variable factor scores based on participants’ scores on other 
variables in the model (Asparouhov & Muthèn, 2010a).   
Data Reduction 
Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics (and correlations) for ToM and EF 
scores respectively. The mean score on the teacher-rated SRSS was 44.04, SD = 8.37, Range: 
18 – 60 at Wave 1 and 42.72, SD = 9.18, Range: 20 – 60 at Wave 2. In line with previous 
studies of individual differences in EF using confirmatory factor analysis, zero-order 
correlations between the EF tasks at both time points were weak to moderate in strength (e.g., 
Miyake et al., 2000). Likewise the inter-correlations between the ToM scores at both time 
points were also weak to moderate in strength. CFA can be used in such situations to extract 
a ‘pure’ measure of each construct by statistically isolating the shared variance between the 
diverse measures of each construct from the task-specific variance and measurement error 
(Brown, 2006; Miyake et al., 2000).  
For the Wave 1 data, using CFA, we specified two measurement models that 
replicated the latent factors for ToM and EF reported elsewhere in the literature (Hughes, 
Ensor & Marks, 2011; Hughes & Ensor, 2011). Standardized factor loadings and residuals for 
each of these models are depicted in Figure 1 panels A and B. First we specified a model in 
which each of the false-belief scores loaded onto a single ToM latent factor. We set the 
metric of the latent variable by fixing the loading of the marker indicator (i.e., 
Predict/Explain False Belief) to 1 (Kline, 2011). This model provided an excellent fit to the 
data, χ2 (4) = 2.71, p = .61, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0. The latent factor exhibited 
significant variance, Unstandardized Est. = 0.21, p = .04. Next we specified a single factor 
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model in which each of the EF task scores loaded onto a single latent factor. Once again we 
set the metric of the latent variable by fixing the loading of the marker indicator (i.e., Tower 
of London) to 1. The model provided an excellent fit to the Wave 1 EF data, χ2 (2) = 1.91, p 
= .38, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.01, RMSEA = 0. The latent factor exhibited significant variance, 
Unstandardized Est. = .09, p = .01.  
Next we specified two latent factor models to measure individual differences in ToM 
and EF at Wave 2. The standardized factor loadings and residuals for each of these models 
are depicted in Figure 1 panels C and D. These models were ‘just-identified’ since there was 
an equal number of model parameters and variances/covariances in the sample matrix 
(Brown, 2006). While model fit estimates cannot be calculated for just-identified models 
because there are 0 degrees of freedom, parameter estimates can be still calculated and 
interpreted (Brown, 2006). In the first model each of the ToM scores loaded onto a single 
ToM latent factor. We set the metric of this latent factor by fixing the loading of the Strange 
Stories task to 1. This latent factor exhibited significant variance, Unstandardized Est. = 2.82, 
p < .05. In the second model each of the EF measures loaded onto a single EF latent factor. 
We set the metric of this latent factor by fixing the Bead Memory task to 1. This latent factor 
showed significant variance, Unstandardized Est. = 3.88, p < .05.  
We created factor scores for each of the latent variables for ToM and EF by imputing 
plausible values (i.e., a distribution of factor scores for each participant) for each latent 
variable using Bayesian estimation in Mplus (Asparouhov & Muthèn, 2010b). Standard factor 
scores calculated using the regression method do not provide reliable estimates of true scores 
when used as dependent variables in regression models (Skrondal & Laake, 2001). Plausible 
values, however, can be used to build models for secondary analysis and provide reliable 
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estimates of the true scores on latent factors (Asparouhov & Muthèn, 2010b). We used 
plausible values based on multiple imputations in each of the longitudinal structural equation 
models reported below. 
To examine the convergent validity of Wave 2 ToM measures we assessed the 
correlation between the scores from the ToM latent factor from Wave 1 and performance on 
each of the measures of ToM at Wave 2. Performance on the ToM latent factor at Wave 1 
was correlated with performance on the Strange Stories, r (135) = .41, p < .001, 90% CI [.29, 
.52], the Triangle Task, r (135) = .27, p < .01, 90% CI [.14, .40] and the Silent Films Task, r 
(135) = .35, p < .001, 90% CI [.23, .45]. When concurrent age and Wave 2 verbal ability 
were accounted for, the Strange Stories, pr (133) = .27, p < .01, 90% CI [.16, .39], Triangles 
Task, pr (133) = .22, p < .05, 90% CI [.08, .36], and Silent Film Task, pr (133) = .25, p < .01, 
90% CI [.12, .40] remained correlated with Wave 1 ToM.  
ToM and EF in Middle Childhood 
Our first aim was to examine the associations between EF and ToM within and across 
each wave of the study. As shown in Table 4, there were moderate and significant 
correlations within and across waves. Although attenuated, at both time-points concurrent 
associations between ToM and EF remained significant even when concurrent verbal ability 
and age were taken into account. To assess the developmental relations between these two 
constructs across middle childhood we specified a longitudinal structural equation model (see 
Figure 2 for path diagram with standardized estimates and Table S2 for unstandardized 
parameter estimates). We regressed ToM scores at Wave 2 onto ToM scores at Wave 1, EF 
scores at Wave 1, verbal ability at Wave 1 and maternal education (i.e., No qualifications or 
GCSE only = 0; A-Level or Degree = 1). We also regressed EF scores at Wave 2 onto EF 
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scores at Wave 1, ToM scores at Wave 1, verbal ability at Wave 1 and maternal education. 
We permitted each of the variables at Wave 1 and Wave 2 to inter-correlate. This cross-
lagged model fit the data well, χ2 (3) = 2.84, p = .42, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0. 
As shown in Figure 2 (and Table S2), there was weak but significant stability in individual 
differences in EF and ToM across middle childhood. However, there were no significant 
cross-lagged associations between EF and ToM across middle childhood.  
We performed a post-hoc power analysis using Monte Carlo simulation in Mplus 7. 
Using the means and variances from each variable in our sample, we tested whether a sample 
size of 137 participants would be sufficient to detect small-to-medium effects in the cross-
lagged paths of the model described above. We specified the same cross-lagged model but 
calculated the unstandardized regression co-effecients for the two cross-lagged paths in our 
model if the correlation was .30. According to Muthèn and Muthèn (2002) sample sizes 
should be large enough to provide unbiased parameter estimates, unbiased standard errors (so 
that the significance of effects are not over- or under-estimated), sufficient coverage (that is, 
the proportion of replications for which the 95%CI contains the population value should be ≥ 
.91) and sufficient power (that is, the proportion of replications for which the null hypothesis 
of no relationship is rejected should be ≥ .80). Focusing on the two cross-lagged model 
parameters, we assessed four key features, recommended by Muthèn and Muthèn (2002), to 
determine whether the sample size of 137 was sufficient: parameter bias < 10%; standard 
error bias < 5%; coverage between .91 and .98; power close to .80. Our results revealed that 
both paths exhibited low levels of parameter bias (both < 1%) and low levels of standard 
error bias (both <5%). Coverage for both parameters was .94 and the power to detect medium 
effects for both parameters was close to .80 (.78 and .84 respectively). Together these results 
suggest that a sample of 137 participants was sufficient to detect medium effects.  
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ToM, EF and Social Competence in Middle Childhood 
Our second aim was to assess the links between ToM, EF and teacher-rated social 
competence at school. Note that some teachers provided questionnaires for more than one 
study participant. Specifically, 13 teachers completed questionnaires on 2 participants, 3 
teachers on 3 participants, 1 teacher on 4 participants, 1 teacher on 5 participants and 1 
teacher on 6 participants. The remaining questionnaires were completed independently. 
Given that the data were clustered and so variance in social competence ratings could be 
attributable to both child-level variation and teacher-level variation, we calculated an intra-
class correlation (ICC) to determine the proportion of total variance in social competence 
ratings that was due to between-teacher variance (Byrne, 2012; Muthèn, 1997). The ICC for 
the social competence rating was .11 indicating that between-teacher variance was minimal 
(Byrne, 2012). We therefore assessed the longitudinal relations between ToM, EF and social 
competence across middle childhood using a single-level longitudinal structural equation 
model (See Figure 3 for path diagram with standardized estimates and Table S3 for 
unstandardized parameter estimates). Specifically, Wave 2 ToM scores were regressed onto 
Wave 1 ToM scores, Wave 1 EF scores, Wave 1 teacher-rated social competence scores, 
Wave 1 verbal ability, gender (i.e., Male = 0; Female = 1) and maternal education. Wave 2 
teacher-rated social competence scores were regressed onto Wave 1 teacher-rated social 
competence scores, Wave 1 ToM scores, Wave 1 EF scores, Wave 1 verbal ability, maternal 
education, and gender. Finally Wave 2 EF scores were regressed onto Wave 1 EF scores, 
Wave 1 ToM scores, Wave 1 teacher-rated social competence scores, Wave 1 verbal ability, 
gender and maternal education. Each of the variables at Wave 1 and Wave 2 were permitted 
to inter-correlate with other concurrent measures. This cross-lagged model provided an 
excellent fit to the data, χ2 (5) = 3.37, p = .64, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.01. 
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Inspection of this model revealed that individual differences in ToM, EF and teacher-rated 
social competence exhibited modest but significant relative stability across middle childhood 
(see Figure 3). Importantly, Wave 1 ToM scores showed a weak but significant independent 
association with Wave2 teacher-rated social competence at school. In contrast, Wave 1 
teacher-rated social competence was unrelated to Wave 2 ToM scores. Moreover there were 
no cross-lagged associations between EF scores and teacher-rated social competence scores. 
To confirm our findings we re-ran this model using a multi-level framework clustering the 
social competence data by teacher. The model provided an excellent fit to the data, χ2 (6) = 
3.37, p = .76, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.01 and the pattern of results remained 
unchanged. 
We performed a Monte Carlo simulation to examine whether the sample size of 137 
provided sufficient power to detect medium effects (r = .30) on each of the six cross-lagged 
paths in the model. As before we used the means and variances for each variable from our 
sample and specified a model identical to that described above. In addition we specified that 
data on the teacher-rated social competence measure at both time points would be missing for 
approximately 25% of the sample. For each of the 6 cross-lagged paths there were low levels 
of parameter bias (0.11 – 1.79%) and acceptable levels of standard error bias (2.07% - 
4.88%). The coverage ranged from .93 to .94 and power estimates ranged from .77 to .85. 
These findings suggest that the sample size provided sufficient power to detect small to 
medium effects in the specified model. 
Discussion  
ToM and EF in Middle Childhood 
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 Our study revealed that, despite the differences in the ToM tasks used at ages 6 and 
10, both time-points showed similarly moderate concurrent associations between individual 
differences in ToM and EF that echoed the findings from a meta-analysis of preschool data 
(Devine & Hughes, 2014). In contrast, there were no significant cross-lagged associations 
between these two constructs across the 4-year interval between study time-points. This lack 
of longitudinal association is open to at least three possible explanations.  
First, aspects of the study design might have masked any longitudinal effects. 
Specifically, the extended measurement interval (which exceeded that of all previous 
longitudinal studies of ToM and EF) might have attenuated the association between 
individual differences in ToM and EF. In addition some of our measures of EF at Wave 1 
may not have been sufficiently challenging for the participants as indicated by evidence of 
ceiling effects on the Day/Night Task (67% at ceiling) and the Trucks Game (88% at ceiling). 
The other two EF tasks at Wave 1 were developmentally appropriate and exhibited normal 
distributions. That said it is still possible that ceiling effects in two of our EF measures might 
have attenuated any associations between EF and ToM. Finally, although the post-hoc power 
analyses revealed that there was a sufficiently large sample size to detect medium cross-
lagged effects, it is still possible that our sample was not large enough to detect small cross-
lagged effects. Larger samples would be needed to detect such effects. 
 The second possible explanation is that the presence of concurrent but not 
longitudinal associations between EF and ToM might indicate that these two constructs 
develop in tandem across middle childhood. Consequently, the observed asymmetry in the 
longitudinal links between EF and ToM in early childhood (Devine & Hughes, 2014) might 
disappear while concurrent associations might remain. The third possibility is that EF is 
Running Head: THEORY OF MIND IN MIDDLE CHILDHOOD 
 27 
related to ToM performance in middle childhood but may not drive any further 
developmental change in ToM in this period. If so, this would suggest a developmental shift 
in the nature of the relation between these two constructs from emergence (in the preschool 
years) to expression (in middle childhood).  
Note, however, that the lack of developmental links between ToM and EF in middle 
childhood does not mean that the concurrent associations between these constructs are trivial. 
Although gains in EF across middle childhood may have no implication for the continued 
growth of ToM across this period, EF might still play an important role in the process of 
reading others’ minds. Concurrent correlations between ToM and EF in middle childhood 
and beyond indicate that EF is an integral component of ToM beyond the preschool years. As 
Apperly (2011) has proposed, EF may contribute to many of the processes involved in 
attributing mental states to others, including inferring what others think, temporarily storing 
this information in mind and using this information to explain and predict others’ behavior. 
Given that there are at least three potential explanations for our findings, our study 
signals the need for further longitudinal research on the links between EF and ToM in middle 
childhood and more specifically the need for repeated-measures designs over shorter 
measurement intervals. The extended temporal span of the current study precluded us from 
using the same measures of ToM and EF at both time points in order to examine directly 
whether change in one construct results in change in the other. In recent years a wide range 
of tasks suitable for measuring ToM (and indeed EF) across middle childhood has become 
available. Designs incorporating multiple time points in middle childhood will reveal whether 
changes in EF are related to growth in ToM and vice versa. Short-term repeated-measures 
studies could be used to test whether EF is implicated in more proximal developmental 
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changes in ToM in middle childhood. Finally, looking beyond longitudinal associations 
between EF and ToM, the use of tasks designed to isolate particular components of reasoning 
about others’ mental states (e.g., Apperly, Back, Samson & France, 2008) may lead to greater 
insights into the role of EF in the expression or use of ToM beyond the preschool years.  
ToM, EF and Social Competence in Middle Childhood 
Our moderate within-time correlations between ToM and teachers’ ratings of social 
competence at ages 6 and 10 complement previously reported associations between 
individual differences in ToM and self- and peer-reported social competence in middle 
childhood (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2011; Devine & Hughes, 2013). Teachers are well placed to 
provide more objective information about children’s social behavior relative to others of a 
similar age (e.g., Stone, Otten, Engels, Vermulst & Janssens, 2010) and the convergence of 
findings from different sources supports the relevance of ToM to children’s social lives in 
middle childhood. Taken together with existing peer-rated and self-reported data, our 
findings suggest that individual differences in ToM in middle childhood might be important 
for successful social interaction and behavior at school. The unidirectional nature of the 
association between early ToM and later social competence in middle childhood supports the 
claim that individual differences in ToM are socially meaningful (e.g., Astington, 2003) but 
contrasts with reports of reciprocal relations between ToM and social competence across a 1-
year measurement interval (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2011). An extended interval of time might be 
required to detect the direction of the relation between ToM and social competence. It is also 
possible that peer acceptance might provide quite a distinct measure of social competence 
than teachers’ ratings of social behavior in the classroom.  
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In contrast, we found only weak concurrent correlations and no evidence of cross-
lagged associations between EF and social competence between the ages of 6 and 10. Studies 
have reported mixed findings about the links between performance on measures of EF and 
teacher- or parent-rated social competence in early and middle childhood. While there appear 
to be weak concurrent associations between EF and social competence in early childhood 
(e.g., Rhoades, Greenberg & Domitrovich, 2009), these findings have not been supported by 
longitudinal studies (e.g. Hughes & Ensor, 2011; Razza & Blair, 2009). Moreover, in a recent 
study by Harms, Zayas, Meltzoff and Carlson (2014), individual differences in EF at age 8 
and 12 were unrelated to teachers’ ratings of children’s social competence at age 12. That 
said, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that low levels of EF are related to 
problem behaviors (e.g., Espy, Sheffield, Wiebe, Clark & Moehr, 2011) and to academic 
underachievement (e.g. McClelland, Cameron, Connor, Farris, Jewkes & Morrison, 2007). It 
appears that while EF and ToM are correlated in early and middle childhood, individual 
differences in these abilities contribute to different developmental outcomes. Further 
longitudinal research will be needed to test this hypothesis. 
Our findings extend the current literature both by documenting the developmental 
reach of early individual differences in ToM and by demonstrating the independence of 
longitudinal links between ToM and later social competence at school from other factors 
(e.g., verbal ability, maternal education and EF). This second point suggests that the 
determinants of social competence may differ in early and middle childhood. In contrast with 
findings from the preschool years (e.g., Astington, 2003), verbal ability was unrelated to 
teacher’s ratings of social competence at age 10. Given the inconsistent findings about the 
links between ToM and different aspects of social competence in the early years, our findings 
suggest that individual differences in ToM become more salient in middle childhood. That 
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said, our reliance on a single measure of verbal ability (and indeed social competence) 
precludes firm conclusions about the relations between language and social competence. 
 Likewise, our findings do not provide unqualified support for the notion that ToM is 
vital for children’s social lives. The data indicate that while ToM clearly plays a part in 
children’s social competence at school in middle childhood, it is by no means a sufficient 
explanation (Astington, 2003). Consistent with previous findings about the links between 
ToM and social competence in middle childhood, the longitudinal association reported here, 
although independent and significant, was small in magnitude. Together, these findings 
highlight the importance of other unmeasured influences on children’s social competence. 
Moreover the data reported here are correlational in nature. Training studies would provide 
more robust evidence for claims regarding the developmental relations between ToM and 
social competence both in the preschool years and in middle childhood. In one recent study 
of 9- and 10-year-old children, Lecce, Bianco, Devine, Hughes and Banerjee (2014) found 
that children in a 2-week conversation-based ToM training program showed greater gains in 
performance on the Strange Stories task than children assigned to an active control group (in 
which children discussed physical events in short vignettes). Further work is needed to 
establish whether the benefits of training for ToM performance result in gains in children’s 
social competence in school and other settings.  
Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in ToM 
This study showed, for the first time, that performance on classic false-belief tasks 
predicted later performance on a battery of ‘advanced’ ToM tasks, such that individual 
differences in ToM exhibited weak to moderate stability from ages 6 to 10. Individual 
differences in ToM have been conceptualized in at least two ways. Some researchers have 
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interpreted individual differences in children’s ToM task performance as either 
developmental delays or precocities (e.g., Slaughter & Repacholi, 2003; Wellman, Cross & 
Watson, 2001). Underlying this ‘developmental lag’ perspective is the assumption that 
children who perform poorly on false-belief task batteries will eventually ‘catch up’ with 
their peers with no real developmental consequences (Bartsch & Estes, 1996). In contrast, 
others have argued that variation in the age at which children obtain an understanding of 
mental-state concepts might predict later variation in ToM performance, that is, the ease 
and/or accuracy with which individuals attribute mental states to others (Apperly, 2012). 
Both the stability of individual differences in ToM across the 4-year interval in this study and 
the predictive association between early ToM and later teacher-rated social competence 
support this ‘genuine variation’ model.  
 Second, our longitudinal findings suggest that variation in cognitive skills such as 
verbal ability and EF do not fully explain individual differences in ToM performance in 
middle childhood. The stability of individual differences in cognitive abilities might reflect 
stability in either genetic or environmental influence (Tucker-Drob & Briley, 2014). Previous 
cross-sectional twin studies of ToM in 5-year-olds (Hughes et al., 2005) and 9-year-olds 
(Ronald et al., 2006) demonstrate very little genetic influence on individual differences in 
ToM but do not rule out the possibility of genetic influence on the stability of individual 
differences in ToM across middle childhood and beyond. Our study findings are also silent 
on this issue as the two time-points both fell within a developmental period when British 
children attend primary school and so typically remain with the same group of classmates. 
Recent longitudinal work in middle childhood suggests that peer acceptance predicts later 
individual differences in ToM (Banerjee et al., 2011). Therefore, if the environmental 
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account of stability is correct, one might predict a decrease in the longitudinal stability of 
ToM across the transition to secondary school when children enter a new social milieu.  
 Earlier we noted that recent studies have demonstrated age-related improvements in 
performance on a range of ‘advanced’ ToM tasks across middle childhood. Researchers must 
now attempt to identify what factors might underpin the continued growth of the ability to 
reason about others’ mental states in this developmental period. Social factors may have a 
main effect on the development of ToM beyond the preschool years. To date research on 
ToM, both in the preschool years and beyond, has focused on social or cognitive correlates in 
isolation. If cognitive factors, such as EF, do not exert a main effect on the development of 
ToM across middle childhood, these factors could nonetheless act as moderators of social 
influences. Enhanced EF, for example, might enable children to better attend to and reflect 
upon relevant social experiences (Hughes & Devine, 2015).  
For more than three decades, research on ToM has focused predominantly on the 
preschool years. In this paper we have attempted to extend the traditional developmental 
scope of ToM research by examining the links between ToM, EF and social competence in 
middle childhood. Our findings revealed concurrent but not longitudinal associations between 
individual differences in ToM and EF across a four-year period in middle childhood. In 
addition, our findings showed both concurrent and longitudinal correlations between 
individual differences in ToM and children’s social competence at school. These findings 
both provide an opportunity to re-evaluate existing theories of ToM and suggest promising 
future avenues for future research on individual differences in ToM in middle childhood.  
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Table 1. Summary of Key Measures at Wave 1 and Wave 2 
Construct Task Wave Ability Assessed Scale 
ToM Object Transfer & 
Unexpected Contents  
1 Predict and explain a character’s behavior with reference to false 
beliefs. 
Categorical 
 Emotion False-Belief Task 
Puppet Stories 
1 Attribute a false belief to a character. Infer and explain a character’s 
emotion based on his/her false beliefs. 
Categorical 
 Second-Order False-Belief 
Task 
1 Attribute a false belief to a character. Infer and explain a character’s 
emotion based on his/her false beliefs. 
Categorical 
 Strange Stories Task 2 Explain a character’s behavior with reference to mental states across 
five short text-based vignettes. 
Continuous 
 Triangles Task 2 Attribute mental states to explain the actions of two animated 
triangles. 
Continuous 
 Silent Film Task 2 Explain a character’s behavior with reference to mental states across 
five clips from a silent film.  
Continuous 
EF Tower of London  1  Planning, working memory, inhibition Continuous 
 Bead Memory Task  1 & 2 Working memory, inhibition  Continuous 
 Day/Night Task 1 Inhibition Categorical 
 Trucks Game 1 Set shifting Categorical 
 Arrows Task 2 Inhibition Continuous 
 Faces Task 2 Set shifting Continuous 
Verbal BPVS  1 & 2 Receptive vocabulary Continuous 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Theory of Mind Tasks 
 Task Wave 1  Wave 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Predict/Explain False Belief - .26** .20* .24** .24**  .18* .10 .14 
2 Predict False Belief (I) .24** - .25** .51** .25**  .27** .16 .17* 
3 Predict False Belief (II) .14 .17* - .37** .79**  .35** .06 .25** 
4 Infer/Explain Emotion based on 
False Belief 
.17* .46** .26** - .40**  .33** .32** .24** 
5 Infer/Explain Second-Order 
False Belief  
.18* .14 .75** .25** -  .38** .09 .30** 
6 Strange Stories .10 .20* .24** .20* .26**  - .34** .31** 
7 Triangles Task .07 .12 .03 .29** .03  .24** - .21* 
8 Silent Film Task .12 .10 .17* .12 .20*  .22** .17* - 
           
 Mean 1.50 1.84 1.09 2.90 1.50  6.39 12 7.66 
 SD 0.66 0.46 0.86 1.53 1.59  2.39 3.97 2.11 
 Range 0 – 2 0 – 2 0 – 2 0 – 4 0 – 4  1 – 10 3 - 19 1 – 12 
Note. **p < .01. *p < .05. Concurrent partial correlations controlling for verbal ability and age are presented below the diagonal. 
Longitudinal partial correlations control for earlier verbal ability and concurrent age. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Executive Function Tasks.  
  Wave 1  Wave 2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Tower of London - .26** .27** .26**  .27** .32** .37** 
2 Bead Memory (Wave 1) .12 - .17* .10  .42** .33** .25** 
3 Day/Night Task (Pass/Fail) .29** .10 - .24**  .06 .03 .16 
4 Trucks Game (Pass/Fail) .27** .01 .22** -  .09 .17* .05 
5 Bead Memory (Wave 2) .15 .33** .04 .01  - .38** .30** 
6 Smiling Faces Efficiency (Test) (/s) .25** .17* .03 .13  .19* - .35** 
7 Arrows Task Efficiency (Test) (/s) .31** .16 .13 .05  .17* .22** - 
          
 Mean 5.94 14.96 0.67 0.88  25.84 0.48 0.68 
 SD 2.01 4.03 0.47 0.32  3.42 0.12 0.46 
 Range 0 – 9 7 - 25 0 – 1 0 – 1  18 – 36 .16 - .79 0 – 1.86 
Note. **p < .01. *p < .05. Concurrent partial correlations controlling for verbal ability and age are presented below the diagonal. 
Longitudinal partial correlations control for earlier verbal ability and concurrent age. 
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Table 4. Concurrent and Longitudinal Correlations Between Theory of Mind, Executive Function, Verbal Ability and Social Competence. 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 ToM (Wave 1) - .44** .32** .47** .35** .34** 
2 EF (Wave 1) .32** - .16 .34** .38** .18
+
 
3 Teacher-Rated Social Competence (Wave 1) .27** .07 - .17
+
 .12 .31** 
4 ToM (Wave 2) .35** .10 -.01 - .41** .29** 
5 EF (Wave 2) .18* .25** .05 .17* - .12 
6 Teacher-Rated Social Competence (Wave 2) .32** .17
+
 .29** .32** .14 - 
        
 Concurrent Age .19* .36** .17
+
 .12 .20* -.08 
 Concurrent Verbal Ability .53** .36** .15 .54** .57** .12 
 Maternal Education .25** .28** .05 .40** .37** .18
+
 
 Gender -.05 -.08 .09 -.10 -.25** .30** 
 Note. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
+
p < .10. Partial correlations are presented below the diagonal. Concurrent partial correlations control for 
verbal ability and age. Longitudinal partial correlations control for final age, earlier verbal ability and, for cross-lagged correlations, 
earlier scores on the dependent variable. N involving correlations for Teacher-Rated Social Competence at Wave 1 and Wave 2 = 103.  
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Figure 1. Standardized Estimates for Measurement Models for ToM and EF Latent 
Factors at Wave 1 and Wave 2. 
Note. **p < .01. ToM = Theory of Mind. EF = Executive Function. W1 = Wave 1. 
W2 = Wave 2. Explain = Predict/Explain False Belief. Predict(1) = Predict False 
Belief I. Predict(2) = Predict False Belief II. Emotion = Infer/Explain Emotion False 
Belief. Second = Infer/Explain Second Order False Belief. ToL = Tower of London. 
DN = Day Night Task.  
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Figure 2. Path Diagram Depicting Longitudinal Relations Between Theory of Mind and Executive Function. 
Note. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
+
p < .10. Paths with p > .05 are shown in grey. See Table S2 for unstandardized parameter estimates and standard 
errors for all parameters in the model. ToM = Theory of Mind, EF = Executive Function, BPVS = Verbal Ability, SES = Maternal Education, 1 
= Wave 1, 2 = Wave 2. 
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Figure 2. Path Diagram Depicting Longitudinal Relations Between Theory of Mind, Executive Function and Social Competence. 
Note. **p < .01. *p < .05. 
+
p < .10. Paths with p > .05 are shown in grey. For clarity, covariances between predictor variables are not depicted. 
See Table S3 for unstandardized parameter estimates and standard errors for all parameters in the model. ToM = Theory of Mind, EF = 
Executive Function, SC = Teacher-Rated Social Competence, BPVS = Verbal Ability, SES = Maternal Education, 1 = Wave 1, 2 = Wave 2. 
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